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The political economy of corporate control

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346462

The political economy of corporate control

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003204007

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2010

This paper develops a framework for analyzing transactions that transfer a company's controlling block from an existing controller to a new controller. This framework is used to compare the market rule, which is followed in the United States, with the equal opportunity rule, which prevails in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139247

Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument

Becker, Bo - 2011

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120315

The 'Lemons Effect' in Corporate Freeze-Outs

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2008

In a corporate freeze-out, the controller is required to compensate minority shareholders for the no-freezeout value of their shares that are taken from them. This paper seeks to highlight the difficulties involved in determining this no-freezeout value when private information. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774877

Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures, and Hostile Takeovers

Kahl, Matthias - 2006

We determine firms' equity ownership structures and provide a theory of hostile takeovers by distinguishing the roles … institutional investors are run by professional managers and hence face agency conflicts. Because rich investors face no agency … problems they are better at monitoring managers. If their wealth is insufficient to control all corporations, then agency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783983

Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing

Albuquerque, Rui A. - 2010

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759940

Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership

Edmans, Alex - 2014

This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048056

Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership

Hart, Oliver; Moore, John - 2021

We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm -- an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: nonprofit cooperatives and outside...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219182

Corporate Ownership Structures : Private Versus Social Optimality

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Zingales, Luigi - 2021

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies that might arise in the ownership structure chosen at the initial public offering stage. We show that, contrary to what is commonly believed, the desire of initial owners to maximize their proceeds leads them to choices that, although privately optimal, may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235285