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Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2004

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335222

Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets

Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1995

experiments ruled out gift exchange or reciprocity motives, that is, subjects could not reciprocate for a gift. This paper reports … results indicate that reciprocity motives may indeed be capable of driving a competitive experimental market permanently away …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764177

Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2003

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333887

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999 - This version: February, 1999

-person ultimatumbargainingexperiments, negative reciprocity (i.e.punishment of unfair offers) plays a crucial role in … decision making.Thehypothesis that selfishness and anticipatednegative reciprocity by proposers together with actual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301150

Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game

Okada, Akiro; Riedl, Arno - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 1999

reported in the literature on 2- person ultimatum bargaining experiments, negative reciprocity (i.e. punishment of unfair … offers) plays a crucial role in decision making. The hypothesis that selfishness and anticipated negative reciprocity by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764158

The impact of the menstrual cycle on bargaining behavior

Lozano, Lina; Riedl, Arno; Rott, Christina - 2024

We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472533

The component fairness solution for cycle-free graph games

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2005

with one another. We introduce a new single-valued solution concept, the component fairness solution. Our solution is … characterized by component efficiency and component fairness. The interpretation of component fairness is that deleting a link … the players in the component. Component fairness replaces the axiom of fairness characterizing the Myerson value, where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348360

When culture does not matter : experimental evidence from coalition formation ultimatum games in Austria and Japan

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999 - This version: March, 1999

This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301151

Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets

Riedl, Arno; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2003

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333878

The condorcet paradox revisited

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380046