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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726

Characterizing the core via k-core covers

Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013

shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779

Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014

merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500

Auctioning and selling positions : a non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts

Brink, René van den; Chun, Youngsub; Ju, Yuan - 2014

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945

Consistency, monotonicity and implementation of egalitarian shapley values

Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372987

k-core covers and the core

Sánchez-Rodriguez, E.; Borm, Peter; … - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 81 (2015) 2, pp. 147-167

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010526381

Resource allocation games : a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games

Grundel, Soesja; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 78 (2013) 2, pp. 149-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010205336

On the 1-nucleolus

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 86 (2017) 2, pp. 309-329

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011780975

Sequencing situations with just-in-time arrical and related games

Lohmann, Edwin; Borm, Peter; Slikker, Marco - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 80 (2014) 3, pp. 285-305

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442257

Characterizations of network power measures

Brink, René van den; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud L. P.; … - 2005

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343952