The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger to transfer a superior technology is derived in a differentiated goods duopoly, for the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition. We show that whenever both royalties and fixed fees are feasible, mergers should not be...

It is well known that the profitability of horizontal mergers with quantity competition is scarce. However, in an asymmetric Stackelberg market we obtain that some mergers are profitable. Our main result is that mergers among followers become profitable when the followers are inefficient enough....

We consider whether banks should be allowed to set different ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the bank. In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002), without considering an interchange fee, a ban on price discrimination on ATM services increases total surplus. In the...

This paper describes the evolution of the daily Euro overnight interestrate (EONIA) by using several models containing the jump component such asa single regime ARCH-Poisson-Gaussian process, with either a piecewisefunction or an autoregressive conditional specification (ARJI) for the...

In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for...

We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-tournament R&D competition. We conclude that merger policy should be, in general, less restrictive in high technology markets (pharmaceuticals and telecoms), because mergers reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D...

Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournotsetting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (i) A low realizationof demand increases the profitability of takeovers. (ii) Takeovers raise the profitability of...

The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in...

We analyze extensively the characteristics of the solution to an irreversibleinvestment decision when the only source of uncertainty comes from interest rates.They are assumed to be driven by the popular Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) stochasticprocess. Particular attention is paid to the impact that...

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing an innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if and only if i) the goods are close enough substitutes, ii) the...