In this paper, we study the return to human capital variables for wages of workers observed in Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999. We develop a new method based on multivariate analysis of firm characteristics, which allows us most of the benefits obtained by introducing firm dummies in...

From Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999, we study the returns to human capital for workers observed in two leading manufacturing sectors. Workers in the mechanical and electrical industries (IMMEE) benefit from higher returns to human capital than their counterparts in the...

In this paper, we study the return to human capital variables for wages of workers observed in Tunisian matched worker-firm data in 1999. This reveals us how returns to human capital in a Less Developed Country like Tunisia may differ from the industrial countries usually studied with matched...

This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What influence can...

In this paper, we draw some lessons from the Tunisian experience of social reforms and associated civil conflict. Our main interest is the riots that occurred after subsidy cuts and the attempts at substitution of price subsidies by direct cash transfers. We propose new welfare indicators apt to...

We study the relationship of wages and education and training practices in Morocco in a context of trade and liberalisation reforms in a matched worker-firm data of eight exporting firms in two industrial sectors: Metallurgical-Electrical industries and Textile-Clothing. We find that the...

Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the...

In this paper a reconstruction of the theory of bargaining with claims in economic environments is addressed. The spirit of that reconstruction is similar to that made by Roemer of the standard bargaining theory.

In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...