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Investor protection and entry

Perotti, Enrico C.; Volpin, Paolo - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003408840

A Pigovian approach to liquidity regulation

Perotti, Enrico C.; Suárez, Javier - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907842

The political economy of financial systems

Haber, Stephen H.; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2008

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374399

The economic value of flexibility when there is disagreement

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2002

We develop an economic theory of “flexibility”, which we interpret as the discretion orability to make a decision that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332819

Disagreement and flexibility : a theory of optimal security issuance and capital structure

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2002

ofthis theory of capital structure evolution is that optimal capital structure is essentiallydynamic, and depends on the firm …’s stock price, implying that firms issue equity when stockprices are high and debt when stock prices are low. The theory … testablepredictions. Moreover, the theory can rationalize the use of debt in the absence of taxes,agency costs or signaling considerations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011332820

The political economy of corporate control

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporategovernance structure and the return to human and financial capital.We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently diffused, thereis political support for a strong governance role for dispersed equitymarket investors, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346462

The political economy of financial fragility

Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico C. - 2005

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348359

Competition and entry in banking : implications for stability and capital regulation

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Marinč, Matej - 2006

We assess the influence of competition and capital regulation on the stability of the banking system. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect (endogenous) entry; and ii) how do (exogenous) changes in the competitive environment affect bank monitoring choices and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348715

Outside finance, dominant investors and strategic transparancy

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2000

This article proposes a theory of corporate transparency and its determinants. We show that under imperfect product … preferred by equity holders. The theory predicts a clustering of firm characteristics that emerge when capital markets are not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316902

Evolution of organizational scale and scope

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Milbourn, Todd; Thakor, Anjan V. - 2002

This paper examines the determinants of organizational scale and scope, with applications to various industries, including financial services. We build a model in which new opportunities arise for firms, but the skills needed to exploit them effectively are unknown. Early investments in these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326952