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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191410
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342576
Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318587
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720501
We analyze the behavior of producers who compete through price competition in a social environment from a sociological point of view. The standard model of Bertrand price competition is enriched with producers who follow a "Win Cooperate, Lose Defect" (WCLD) strategy. This strategy is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010232132
It is widely recognized that the shape of networks influences both individual and aggregate behavior. This raises the question which types of networks are likely to arise. Our paper fits into the literature that addresses this question. The paper continues on the work of Galeotti, Goyal and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334857
We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348697
In this paper we generalize the concept of coalitional games by allowing for any organizational structure within coalitions represented by a graphon the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoffvectors is assigned to any graph on every subset of players. Such a game will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335223
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