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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
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Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
Non, Jan Adrianus - 2011
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379625
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Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013
performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores … from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance …. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591
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The effects of prize and noise in elimination tournaments : a natural field experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720760
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Employee recognition and performance : a field experiment
Bradler, Christiane; Dur, Robert A. J.; Neckermann, Susanne - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724791