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wages reflect this, with lower pay for greater uncertainty. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education … as an indicator of the unobserved heterogeneity that employers face. We find solid evidence that starting wages are lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378868
How valuable is education for entrepreneurs’ performance as compared to employees’? What might explain any differences? And does education affect peoples’ occupational choices accordingly? We answer these questions based on a large panel of US labor force participants. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379475
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874449
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
This paper employs survey data on the reasons to quit of Dutch job changers who entered or left a public sector job in 2001. We show that workers' reasons to quit their public sector job influence their decision to stay in or leave their industry of employment. A bad experience with, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343286
We focus on the dynamic relation between wage increases, promotions and job changes. We relate our empirical analyses to the theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999). In the empirical analyses we use the Portuguese matched employer-employee data Quadros de Pessoal. We conclude from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349718
make it easier for them to switch employers than for the part-time educated auditors. The predictions on tenure and wages …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327827
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000929728
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