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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games

Brink, René van den - 2009

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion … these axioms characterize the equal division solution. Further, we show that there is no solution that satisfies efficiency …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796

From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games

Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576

Distributing dividends in games with ordered players

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2006

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350374

The restricted core for totally positive games with ordered players

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2009

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242

The alpha-constant-sum games

Wang, Wenna; Brink, René van den; Sun, Hao; Xu, Genjiu; … - 2019

Given any α ∈ [0, 1], an α-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S ⊆ N, such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is α times of the worth of the grand coalition....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987594

Power measures and solutions for games under precedence constraints

Algaba, Encarnacion; Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris - 2015

efficiency, linearity, the null player property and hierarchical strength which states that in unanimity games the payoffs are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010464783

The family of ideal values for cooperative games

Wang, Wenna; Su, Hao; Brink, René van den; Xu, Genjiu - 2018

square values. For any selfish coefficient function m, the m-ideal value is characterized by efficiency, linearity, m …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011794249

The Harsanyi set for cooperative TU-games

Vasilʹev, Valerij A.; Laan, Gerard van der - 2001

A cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply aTU-game, describes a situation in which players can obtain certainpayoffs by cooperation. A solution mapping for these games is amapping which assigns to every game a set of payoff distributionsover the players in the game. Well-known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313932

An owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures

Brink, René van den; Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, … - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658

Cooperative games on accessible union stable systems

Algaba, Encarnación; Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris - 2013

Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227326