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Incentive systems in a real effort experiment

Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000981250

How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?

Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949

Incentives, performance and choking in darts

Klein Teeselink, Bouke; Potter van Loon, Rogier J. D.; … - 2018

risk considerations and the behavior of others. We find that amateur and youth players perform better under moderately …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011949171

From public monopsony to competitive market : more efficiency but higher prices

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2002

This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimizing public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical findings, our model implies that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327829

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013

performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to the incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

The degradation of distorted performance measures

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645

The effects of performance measurement and compensation on motivation

Herpen, Marco van; Praag, Mirjam van; Cools, Cornelis - 2003

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333892

Incentive systems in a real effort experiment

Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1997

In the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on theirincentive effects. Payment based on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort. The results show that individual and team payment induced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533205

Biased supervision

Delfgaauw, Josse; Souverijn, Michiel - 2014

When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395075

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