We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change...

The recent macroeconomic literature stresses the importance of managing heterogeneous expectations in the formulation of monetary policy. We use a stylized macro model of Howitt (1992) to investigate inflation dynamics under alternative interest rate rules when agents have heterogeneous...

In this paper, we analyze the relation between interest rate targets and money supply in a (bubble-free) rational expectations equilibrium of a standard cash-in-advance model. We examine lump-sum injections of money aimed to implement interest rate sequences that satisfy interest rate target...

We develop a New Keynesian model where all payments between agents require bank deposits through deposits-in-advance constraints, bank deposits are created through disbursement of bank loans, and banks face a convex lending cost. At the zero lower bound on deposit rates (ZLBD), changes in policy...

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky pricemodel where the central bank supplies money outrightvia asset purchases and lends money temporarily againstcollateral. The terms of central bank lending affect ra-tioning of money and impact on macroeconomic aggre-gates. The central bank can...

In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means ofdirect coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices suchas contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In alocal interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient...

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s (2001) results for interest rate feedback rules, the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for...

Price-level targeting (PLT) is optimal under the fully-informed rational expectations (FIRE) benchmark but lacks empirical support. Given the hurdles to the implementation of macroeconomic field experiments, we utilize a laboratory group experiment - where expectations are elicited from human...