Similar Search Results

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation

Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479787

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

Brink, René van den; Pinter, Miklos - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722981

Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems

Brink, René van den; Núñez, Marina; Robles, Francisco - 2018

In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for two-sided markets with transferable utility, that satisfy some valuation monotonicity and fairness axioms. Valuation fairness requires that changing the valuation of a buyer for the object of a seller leads to equal changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901866

Middlemen : a directed search equilibrium approach

Watanabe, Makoto - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190985

On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2021

The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591528

Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2019

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057140