cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to … coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff …

.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set … of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the …