Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...

Empirical studies showed that many types of network traffic exhibit long-range dependence (LRD),i.e., burstiness on a wide variety of time-scales. Given that traffic streams are indeed endowed withLRD properties, a next question is: what is their impact on network performance? To assess...

We consider a queue fed by a large number, say n, of on-off sources with generally distributed on-and off-times. The queueing resources are scaled by n: the buffer is B=nb and link rate is C=nc.The model is versatile: it allows us to model both long range dependent traffic (by using heavy-tailed...