Similar Search Results

Why do policy makers stick to inefficient decisions?

Dur, Robert A. J. - 1999 - This draft: June 1999

This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301144

When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine

Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382589

The benefits of being economics professor A (and not Z)

Praag, Mirjam van; Praag, Bernard M. S. van - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003644002

Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity : evidence from a field experiment

Soetevent, Adrian R. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003813734

The benefits of being economics professor A (and not Z)

Praag, Mirjam van; Praag, Bernard M. S. van - 2007

experienced afaster growth rate over the course of her career as a result of reputation and visibility.Moreover, authors know that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372501

Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity

Soetevent, Adriaan R. - 2010 - Final version: 04 August, 2010

This paper examines the impact of payment choice on charitablegiving with a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment. Respondentscan donate cash only, use debit only, or have both options. Cash donations have lower visibility vis-a-vis solicitors than debit card donations. When debit replaces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377596

Why are residents reluctant to consult attending physicians?

Swank, Otto H. - 2009

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378360

The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart(dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show thatintroducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herdbehaviour and (ii) shifts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333265

Policy makers, advisors, and reputation

Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334827

Signals in science : on the importance of signaling in gaining attention in science

Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Henkens, Kène - 2004

citations. Three types of signals are examined: the author’s reputation (as producer of the idea), the journal (as the broker of … empirical analysis points out that, first, the reputation of journals plays an overriding role in gaining attention in science … third, the reputation of a journal may help to get late recognition (so-called ‘sleeping beauties’) as well as generate so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337989