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Hu, Audrey Xianhua; Zou, Liang - 2007

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373824

Why do policy makers stick to inefficient decisions?

Dur, Robert A. J. - 1999 - This draft: June 1999

This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301144

When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine

Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2010

motivate employeeswho are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employeesare driven by monetary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382589

Identity and commitment : Sen's conception of the individual

Davis, John Bryan - 2004

-scrutinizing aspect of the self and related concept of commitment, and compares this conception to the co1lective intentionality-based one … with recent standard economics' explanation of social identity in terms of conformity. Sen's concept of commitment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335215

Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device

Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor their intrinsic motivation. A steep wage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

A theory on media bias and elections

Sun, Junze; Schram, Arthur; Sloof, Randolph - 2019

on whether media have commitment power; if not, they can worsen information transmission and voter welfare. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030647

The political economy of commitment to policies

Delfgaauw, Josse; Swank, Otto H. - 2023

commitment. We study policymakers' incentives to commit. A policymaker decides on a policy to encourage citizens to make … redistributive concerns to the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. When a majority of citizens invest, redistributive … time-inconsistency problem. Then, the policymaker either commits too strongly or refrains from commitment altogether. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014369623

Modelling rent-seeking contests

Nitzan, Shmuel - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000122507

The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000960565