Showing 1 - 10 of 151
This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of …, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460007
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337995
incentives and wage gifts on creativity. We find that tournaments substantially increase creative output, with no evidence for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479746
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722672
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After … contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080
We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378827
-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence … between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that it can explain … with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We conclude that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722629
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565