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, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link-convexity …-free communication structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). We introduce the notion of link-convexity … is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the L|N |/2-̦core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224779
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
In this paper we describe the extreme points of two closely related polytopes that are assigned to a digraph. The first polytope is the set of all sharing vectors (elements from the unit simplex) such that each node gets at least as much as each of its successors. The second one is the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335203
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722639
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386146
This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376297