Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …

capture, favor connected interests, and undermine finance access and entry. Thus the degree of access to political rights by …

disequilibrium but little empirical research has examined firm entry and exit in this context. We redress this by modelling the … interrelationship between firm entry and exit in disequilibrium. Introducing a new methodology we investigate whether this … new-firm entry) while in overshoots competition induced by new firms (in particular strong displacement) helps restore …

We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new …

by both high entry and high exit rates. …