Showing 1 - 10 of 149
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific … training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from … laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327532
This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374429
studying or in a full-time educational track. The former training is relatively firm-specific whereas the latter training is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327827
We study hiring in a labor market where worker ability can only be observed on-the-job, but quickly becomes public information after labor market entry. We show that firms in these markets have a socially inefficient incentive to hire low talented, experienced workers instead of more promising...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772903
We investigate whether national borders within Europe hinder the assortative matching of workers to firms in a high skilled labor market. We characterize worker productivity as the ability to contribute to physical output and define firm productivity as the capacity to transform physical output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359032
We decompose the wage premium after foreign acquisitions of Dutch domestic firms into the constituent firm- and worker-level premia. Firm-level premia grow up to 3.5%, accounting for the majority of the acquisition premium. Worker-level premia by contrast, grow up to 1% and only materialize with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012816934
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377053
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377106
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378080