This paper presents a new axiomatic characterization of risk measures that are additive for independent random … variables. In contrast to previous work, we include an axiom that guarantees monotonicity of the risk measure. Furthermore, the …. The risk measure characterized can be regarded as a mixed exponential premium. …

We study the dependence between the downside risk of European banks and insurers. Since the downside risk of banks and … insurers differs, an interesting question from a supervisory point of view is the risk reduction that derives from … diversification within large banks and financial conglomerates. We discuss the limited value of the normal distribution based …

the insurance sector. The downside risk of insurers is explicitly modelled by common and idiosyncratic risk factors. Since … results point to a relatively low insurance sector wide risk. Dependence among insurers is higher than among reinsurers. … reinsurance is important for the capacity of insurers, we measure risk dependence among European insurers and reinsurers. The …

insurance mechanisms, bride wealth qualifies as an importantsecurity enhancing institution: the arrangement covers nearly the …

worker buys an insurance, which gives a constant income and retirement benefits in exchange for the total output. The level …

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex …

We offer a theory of how the combination of budget constraints and insurance drives up prices. A natural context for …

parameter in a data-driven way. A systemic risk surveillance example for business model classification in the global insurance …

markets with small initial loss sizes, insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance. After having … defined insurance and non-insurance markets based on the initial loss size, we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer … power have incentives to create insurance markets. Insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not …

asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation …