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Entrepreneurial moral hazard in income insurance

Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochgürtel, Stefan - 2011

We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618

Better safe than sorry? : ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data

Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - 2008

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376656

A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2008

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377059

An analysis of the effects of the severance payment reform on credit to Italian SMEs

Calcagno, Riccardo; Kräussl, Roman; Monticone, Chiara - 2008

bank loans, we also estimate the future outflows of TFR funds due to the reform. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377271

Disciplining and screening top executives

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199

Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device

Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894

Health effects of containing moral hazard : evidence from disability insurance reform

Garcia-Gomez, Pilar; Gielen, Anne C. - 2014

We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance (DI) reform to identify the health impact of stricter eligibility criteria and reduced generosity. Women subject to the more stringent rule experience greater rates of hospitalization and mortality. A €1,000 reduction in annual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010390077

Till debt do us part : strategic divorces and a test of moral hazard

Kim, Yeorim; Mastrogiacomo, Mauro; Hochgürtel, Stefan; … - 2022

lender against borrower default and transfers the risk to the public. Divorce is one of the major events that obliges the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332708

Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection

Crutzen, Benoît; Sahuguet, Nicolas - 2022 - Latest version: March 2022

Politicians respond to incentives when they decide how to allocate their campaigning time and effort. The literature suggests electoral rules impact politicians' incentives. We argue that the candidate selection process is an equally important source of incentives. We develop a two-stage model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013413488

Credit rationing effects of credit value-at-risk

Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David Jan Cornelis; … - 2004

of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation …Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to … asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334832

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