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Do polls create momentum in political competition?

Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - 2013 - This version: October 2013

We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224792

Peaceful agreements to share a river

Brink, René van den; Nevrekar, Saish - 2020

This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we … along the river, they sequentially bargain over the surplus of water, or decide to engage in a military conflict with their … upstream neighbour. The probability of winning a military conflict is determined by a contest success function which depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195325

Bargaining in the presence of condorcet cycles : the role of asymmetries

Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580

The condorcet paradox revisited

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380046

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation

Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479787

On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2021

The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591528

Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2019

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057140

Spatial search

Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2024

This paper considers a random search model where some locations provide sellers with better chances of meeting many buyers than other locations (for example popular shopping streets or the first page of a search engine). When sellers are heterogeneous in terms of the quality of their product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496539

Competitive search with private information : can price signal quality?

Albrecht, James W.; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; … - 2024

This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a "market for lemons" with competitive search...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053938

Do elections lead to informed public decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2003

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334365

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