We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and …

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first …-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we … observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. X-cursedness gives a robust explanation of our …