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The design of (de)centralized punishment institutions for sustaining co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - 2004

cooperation and sanctioning', 2007, KritV - Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 90, 1-2, 140 … fundamental conflict between social welfare maximization and individual utility maximization. The basic workhorse for modelling … this conflict is the voluntary contribution of a group of individuals to a public good. The common element of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334839

Peaceful agreements to share a river

Brink, René van den; Nevrekar, Saish - 2020

This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we … along the river, they sequentially bargain over the surplus of water, or decide to engage in a military conflict with their … upstream neighbour. The probability of winning a military conflict is determined by a contest success function which depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195325

Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow

Houba, Harold; Ansink, Erik - 2013

, sustainable agreements allow downstream agents to reap the larger share of the benefits of cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224772

The economics of transboundary river management

Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2014

allows us to show how conflict and cooperation over transboundary water resources may occur. It also allows us to pay …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412473

Contests with rank-order spillovers

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2009 - Revised: April 2009

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808

The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2006

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346451

The evolution of morality

Veelen, Matthijs van - 2020

sincerity, and also less nice properties, such as anger, as well as the incidence of conflict. Moreover, it can not only explain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427580

Do polls create momentum in political competition?

Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - 2013 - This version: October 2013

We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224792

Bargaining in the presence of condorcet cycles : the role of asymmetries

Kamm, Aaron; Houba, Harold - 2015

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532580

The condorcet paradox revisited

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Houba, Harold - 2010

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380046