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The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999
-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income … punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous "jumps" in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155
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Cooperation in an overlapping generations experiment
Offerman, Theo; Potters, Jan; Verbon, Harry A. A. - 1998
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infiniteoverlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as aNash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is alsothe inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301169
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Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion
Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2015
threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532586
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Emotions and economic shocks in a first-price auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333886
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Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2006 - This version: 8 August 2006
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349704
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Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converged to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
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Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition … experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
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Yes, I'll do it : a large-scale experiment on the volunteer's dilemma
Kopányi-Peuker, Anita - 2018
cost in a controlled large-scale laboratory experiment, where subjects play the volunteer's dilemma only once. The … experiment varies group sizes ranging from groups of 3 to about 100, and 2 different cost/benefit ratios. Results show that high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901874
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"I" on you : identity in the dictator game
Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Zheng, Jin Di - 2019
We study a giver's generosity depending on her relationship with the recipient and the observer. We assign different group identities to the players using a variation of the minimumgroup paradigm, and test the effect of group memberships on altruistic giving in the dictator game with a passive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012030650
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Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk
Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2023
-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299618