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Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor their intrinsic motivation. A steep wage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

Goal setting and raising the bar : a field experiment

Lent, Max van; Souverijn, Michiel - 2016

We study goal setting using a randomized field experiment involving 1092 first-year undergraduate students. Students have private mentor-student meetings during the year. We instructed a random subset of mentors to encourage students to set a course-specific grade goal during one of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583305

Non-competitive wage-setting as a cause of unfriendly and inefficient leadership

Dur, Robert A. J.; Kvaløy, Ola; Schöttner, Anja - 2018 - This draft: November 2018

This paper develops a simple economic model to examine how leadership styles in organizations depend on the prevailing wage-setting conditions for workers. In particular, we examine a leader who can - in addition to the use of monetary incentives - motivate a worker by adopting leadership styles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936032

Transparency and pre-meetings

Swank, Job; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006

Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349202

Is transparency to no avail? : committee decision-making, pre-meetings, and credible deals

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2007

transparency, and committee members’ aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372992

Need to know? : on information systems in firms

Bijkerk, Suzanne; Delfgaauw, Josse; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2018 - This version: November 14, 2018

evil. Transparency allows for influential communication to external parties, but constrains internal communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932570

Pitfalls of pay transparency : evidence from the lab and the field

Brütt, Katharina; Yuan, Huaiping - 2022

Wage transparency regulation is widely considered and adopted as a tool to reduce the gender wage gap. We combine field … and laboratory evidence to address how and when wage transparency can be effective and explore the role of belief … adjustments as a mechanism. In the field, this paper studies a German wage transparency policy that allows employees to request …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013348353

The effect of noise in a performance measure on work motivation

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008

expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376648

Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory : an experimental study

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2006

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343251

Job satisfaction, wages and allocation of older workers

Groot, Wim - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000934378