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The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment
Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2006
This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346451
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Efficient allocation of land between productive use and recreational use : an application to Galician case
Giménez, Eduardo L.; González Gómez, Manuel - 2001
In this paper the efficient allocation of natural recreational areasis analysed. Natural recreational areas have the … features of publicgoods. We present the efficient allocation of this non-excludablepublic good in a rational general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316862
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A bit of salt a trace of life : gender norms and the impact of a salt iodization program on human capital formation of school aged children
Deng, Zichen; Lindeboom, Maarten - 2020 - Current version: Tuesday 8th September, 2020
for boys. For non-cognitive skills, we find the opposite. We show in a simple model of parental investment that gender … preferences can explain our findings. Analyses exploiting within the province, village-level variation in gender attitudes confirm … the importance of parental gender preferences. Consequently, large scale programs can have positive (and possibly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427619
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The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999
The power to take game is a simple two player game where players arerandomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder.Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual realeffort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155
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Exploitation and cooperation in networks
Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2004
A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335196
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Endogenous effort norms in hierarchical firms
Tichem, Jan - 2013
This paper studies how a three-layer hierarchical firm (principal-supervisor-agent) optimally creates effort norms for its employees. The key assumption is that effort norms are affected by the example of superiors. In equilibrium, norms are eroded as one moves down the hierarchy. The reason is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226550
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Everybody's doing it : on the emergence and persistence of bad social norms
Smerdon, David; Offerman, Theo; Genîzî, Ûrî - 2016
Social norms permeate society across a wide range of issues and are important to understanding how societies function. In this paper we concentrate on 'bad' social norms - those that are inefficient or even damaging to a group. This paper explains how bad social norms evolve and persist; our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446896
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The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment
Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003073147
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Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters
Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2015
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477108
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Denial and alarmism in collective action problems
Förster, Manuel; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2018
We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute or not, each agent submits an unverifiable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801387