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Efficient allocation of land between productive use and recreational use : an application to Galician case

Giménez, Eduardo L.; González Gómez, Manuel - 2001

In this paper the efficient allocation of natural recreational areasis analysed. Natural recreational areas have the … features of publicgoods. We present the efficient allocation of this non-excludablepublic good in a rational general …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316862

A bit of salt a trace of life : gender norms and the impact of a salt iodization program on human capital formation of school aged children

Deng, Zichen; Lindeboom, Maarten - 2020 - Current version: Tuesday 8th September, 2020

for boys. For non-cognitive skills, we find the opposite. We show in a simple model of parental investment that gender … preferences can explain our findings. Analyses exploiting within the province, village-level variation in gender attitudes confirm … the importance of parental gender preferences. Consequently, large scale programs can have positive (and possibly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427619

The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003073147

Everybody's doing it : on the emergence and persistence of bad social norms

Smerdon, David; Offerman, Theo; Genîzî, Ûrî - 2016

Social norms permeate society across a wide range of issues and are important to understanding how societies function. In this paper we concentrate on 'bad' social norms - those that are inefficient or even damaging to a group. This paper explains how bad social norms evolve and persist; our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446896

The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players arerandomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder.Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual realeffort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155

Exploitation and cooperation in networks

Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2004

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335196

Negative reciprocity and the interaction of emotions and fairness norms

Reuben, Ernesto; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2005

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this effect is consistent across repeated play and role experiences. A repeated version of the power-to-take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343297

The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2006

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346451

Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters

Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2015

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477108

Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303327