This note identifies profit shifting in response to cross-countrydifferences in corporate tax rates as a source of productivitymismeasurement. To quantify the magnitude of mismeasurement, theprofit-shifting effect is isolated from other possible effects ofcorporatetax rates changes on real...

This paper analyses the national tax treatment of interestexpenditures of multinational enterprises in a non-cooperative world. It is shown that the international tax systemgenerally leads to distortions in the capitaldecisions of multinational firms. In contrast to the existingliterature on the...

In this study we have analysed policy interactions between an urban and a regional government which have different objectives (welfare of its own citizens) and two policy instruments (toll and capacity) available. Using a simulation model, we investigated the welfare consequences of the various...

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for...

This paper is concerned with a policy oriented macroeconomic experiment involving an 'international' economy with a relatively small 'home' country and a large 'foreign' country. It compares the economic performance of two alternative tax systems as a means to finance unemployment benefits: a...

This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors’ tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax...

This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors' tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax...