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A note on passepartout problems
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Hamers, Herbert - 2010
This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a … unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is then how to share the total … appropriate allocation rule. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380133
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Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college admissions environment
Shorrer, Ran I.; Sóvágó, Sándor - 2017
In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772987
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The economics of transboundary river management
Ansink, Erik; Houba, Harold - 2014
game theory to assess the economics of transboundary river water allocation in a simple model of river sharing. This model …We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the … attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary river water allocation. These strategic aspects are captured by employing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412473
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Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible, indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001412148
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The role and evolution of central authorities
Frijters, Paul; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1999
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means ofdirect coordination or the enforcement of re-commitment devices suchas contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In alocal interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302150
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Information overload in multi-stage selection procedures
Ficco, Stefano; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2004
The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335195
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The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2004
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335223
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The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343948
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Evaluation problem versus selection problem in organizational structures
Ficco, Stefano; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2005
We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343955
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Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2006 - This version: 8 August 2006
While most papers_new on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349704