We propose a credit portfolio approach for evaluating systemic risk and attributing it across institutions. We construct a model that can be estimated from high-frequency CDS data. This captures risks from privately held institutions and cooperative banks, extending approaches that rely on...

We address the problem of regulating the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk and by developing a modeling mechanism through which capital buffers can be allocated efficiently across systemic banks. First, a Distance-to-Default type...

We propose a credit portfolio approach for evaluating systemic risk and attributing it across institutions. We construct a model that can be estimated from high-frequency CDS data. This captures risks from publicly traded banks, privately held institutions, and coöperative banks, extending...

We propose a regulatory approach for restricting debt financing as an amplification mechanism across the financial system. A small stylised model illustrates the trade-off between static and time varying limits on leverage in dampening the financial cycle. The policy section proposes its...

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groupsand policymakers, featuringendogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamicpatterns in economicpolicies may arise once interest group formation is taken intoaccount.

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...