We present a strategic game of pricing and targeted-advertising. Firms cansimultaneously target priceadvertisements to different groups of customers, or to the entiremarket. Pure strategy equilibria do not exist and thus marketsegmentation cannot occur surely. Equilibria exhibit random...

We analyze a market where firms compete in a conventional and an electronicretail channel. Consumers easily compare prices online, but some incur purchaseuncertainties on the online channel. We investigate the market shares of the two retailchannels and the prices that are charged. We find that...

We analyze the incentives for incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms and newentrants to start an online retail channel in a differentiated goods market. Tothis end we set up a two-stage model where firms first decide whether or notto build the infrastructure necessary to start an online retail...

This paper analyzes the effects of price differentiation and discrimination by a monopolistic transport operator, which sets fares in a congestible network. Using three models, with different spatial structures, we describe the operator's optimal strategies in an unregulated market, a market...

This paper analyzes third-degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served. The model features the business-passenger and leisure-passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation, and a less...

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an...