between competitive and collusive basing-point pricing. We define a measure for the likelihood of collusion that can be used … screen with a software. The test is hard to beat for cartels using this otherwise elusive form of price-fixing. When a cartel … was found to have abused the basing-point system, our method can be used to estimate antitrust damages. …

collusion. It allows an upstream cartel to shield itself from private damage claims by forwarding a share of cartel profits to … private damages. The cartel can achieve this by rationing inputs at low prices. Several U.S. antitrust cases show symptoms of … recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to …

which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate increases in a systematic way with the cartel …

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are … linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that … we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the maximal cartel price, the largest price for which the …

This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and … theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust. …

collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how likely cartels persist after each conviction. Our analysis … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to …

significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal … the antitrust authority and the leniency program are directed exclusively to the most straightforward collusive scheme …, subjects manage to switch to a more intricate form of coordination. This shift from overt collusion to tacit collusion …

detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy … lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. For a range of low cartel prices, the fine is set …We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to …

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue … conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the …

antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before-during-and-after method … actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but … with an empirical cartel dating procedure that uses multiple structural break tests to determine the actual begin and end …