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Two values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
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An owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures
Brink, René van den; Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, … - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658
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Centrality rewarding shapley and Myerson values for undirected graph games
Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - 2016
the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that … can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication … unanimity game on the grand coalition all players are treated equally and so players with a more central position in the graph …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120
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Share functions for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722635
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From hierarchies to levels : new solutions for games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Brink, René van den; Laan, … - 2015
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
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The restricted core for totally positive games with ordered players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasilʹev, … - 2009
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378242
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Efficiency and collusion neutrality of solutions for cooperative TU-games
Brink, René van den - 2009
coalition' is distributed proportional to these weights. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378796
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Null or zero players : the difference between the shapley value and the egalitarian solution
Brink, René van den - 2004
.e. players who contribute nothing to any coalition. We show that in these characterizations, replacing null players by zero … players characterizes the egalitarian solution, where a player is a zero player if every coalition containing this player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342569
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The Harsanyi set for cooperative TU-games
Vasilʹev, Valerij A.; Laan, Gerard van der - 2001
A cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply aTU-game, describes a situation in which players can obtain certainpayoffs by cooperation. A solution mapping for these games is amapping which assigns to every game a set of payoff distributionsover the players in the game. Well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313932
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Cooperative games on accessible union stable systems
Algaba, Encarnación; Brink, René van den; Dietz, Chris - 2013
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some relational structure. The aim of this paper is to introduce a new framework taking into account both communication and hierachical features derived from this participation. In fact, this new set or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227326