Showing 1 - 10 of 354
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead … to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions under which a white knight wins the takeover contest … white knights as an anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the market for corporate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377390
We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975
-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374396
predicts individual landowners' bids, overall participation rates in the auction, as well as the expected net benefits to the … conservation agency. We find that market efficiency of the auction increases in the number of potential corridors. We use … simulations to compare a benchmark auction with two policy scenarios in a hypothetical landscape. In one scenario, members of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011636462
firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market prof-its are uncertain so that winning an auction is like winning a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343288
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724097
We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421803
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011664217
question of the value added of letting the sourcing process consist of both an auction and a negotiation stage, theoretically … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341