Similar Search Results

Information Overload in Monopsony Markets

Ficco, Stefano - 2004

I consider a situation in which heterogenous senders (applicants) compete in order to be selected by one receiver (employer). Productivity is private information to the senders, and the receiver processes imperfect signals (applications) to screen among applicants. The information-processing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337401

Equilibrium selection under different learning modes in supermodular games

Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1999

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143

Subjective expectations of medical expenditures and insurance in rural Ethiopia

Yilma, Zelalem; O'Donnell, Owen; Mebratie, Anagaw; … - 2015

Little is known about perceptions of medical expenditure risks despite their presumed relevance to health insurance demand. This paper reports on a unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures from rural Ethiopians who are offered the opportunity to purchase health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376274

Herding, information cascades and volatility spillovers in futures markets

McAleer, Michael; Radalj, Kim - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784945

The herodotus paradox

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2010

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381852

Diffusion of behavior in network games orchestrated by social learning

Huang, Jiaping; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines - 2013

-benefit parameter. There are four main insights of our model: (1) A variety of collective adoption behaviors is determined by the … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of … adoption which ensures the new behavior to prevail. (4) Equilibria and dynamic behavior changes as we change the underlying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227321

Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly

Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372971

Persuading an audience : testing information design in the laboratory

Ziegler, Andreas - 2023

Governments, central banks, and private organizations frequently face the challenge of convincing their audience to take a specific action. One key choice is whether to send a public message that can coordinate the audience's actions or to rely instead on private messages that may differ across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335546

Terrorist targeting, information, and secret coalitions

Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; McCormick, Gordon H.; … - 2010

We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379528

Catching hipo's : screening, wages and unemployment

Janssen, Maarten C. W. - 2000

In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303310

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last