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The degradation of distorted performance measures
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645
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Paid to quit
Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783
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Testing for distortions in performance measures : an application to residual income based measures like economic value added
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2014
Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350010
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Optimal income taxation in unionized labor markets
Hummel, Albert Jan; Jacobs, Bas - 2018
This paper extends the Diamond (1980) model with labor unions to study optimal income taxation and to analyze whether … unions can be desirable for income redistribution. Unions bargain with firms over wages in each sector and firms unilaterally … determine employment. Unions raise the efficiency costs of income redistribution, because unemployment benefits and income taxes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895596
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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
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Are CEOs incentivized to avoid corporate taxes? : empirical evidence on managerial bonus contracts
Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2014
In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between corporate income taxes and CEO bonus payments. Using Compustat and ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346227
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Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay : a field experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; … - 2013
We conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382591
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Biased supervision
Delfgaauw, Josse; Souverijn, Michiel - 2014
When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395075
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The effects of performance measurement and compensation on motivation
Herpen, Marco van; Praag, Mirjam van; Cools, Cornelis - 2003
This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333892
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The flipside of comparative payment schemes
Buser, Thomas; Dreber, Anna - 2013
Comparative payment schemes and tournament-style promotion mechanisms are ubiquitous in the work place. We test experimentally whether they have a negative impact on the willingness to cooperate. Participants first perform in a simple task and then participate in a public goods game. The payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225779