Showing 1 - 10 of 87
This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to … employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238944
We study hiring in a labor market where worker ability can only be observed on-the-job, but quickly becomes public … the firm, or when workers cannot commit to long-term contracts. In a dataset covering 38 years of hiring in the English … this hiring behavior is inefficient, because it has persistently depressed the average ability of the active manager labor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772903
We embed a competitive search model with labor market discrimination, or nepotism, into a two-sector, two …-country framework in order to analyze how labor market discrimination impacts the pattern of international trade and also how trade … trade affects discrimination. Discrimination, or nepotism, reduces the matching probability and output in the skilled …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520834
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191077
We investigate whether national borders within Europe hinder the assortative matching of workers to firms in a high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359032
One acclaimed role of managers is to monitor workers in team production processes and discipline them through the threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a manager that can decide to replace some of her team members...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532586
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720760
This paper studies how a three-layer hierarchical firm (principal-supervisor-agent) optimally creates effort norms for its employees. The key assumption is that effort norms are affected by the example of superiors. In equilibrium, norms are eroded as one moves down the hierarchy. The reason is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226550