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Monitoring your friends, not your foes : strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Siemens, Ferdinand von; … - 2012
In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382041
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The importance of accounting for time trends when estimating the Euro effect on trade
Bun, Maurice J. G.; Klaassen, Franc - 2004
To study the effect of the euro on international goods trade one typically estimates a panel model for the level of trade. Trade levels increase over time, and we show that this is not fully explained by the included regressors. Because the euro is only present at the end of the sample, this may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334328
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Has the Euro increased trade?
Bun, Maurice J. G.; Klaassen, Franc - 2002
A major economic reason for the introduction of the euro was its supposedly positive effect on intra-EMU trade. Existing studies examine this suspicion indirectly using non-EMU data and report ambiguous results. We estimate the euro-effect directly from data that include EMU observations. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327839
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Sharing information through delegation and collaboration
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2004
This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and … explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335224
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Communication versus (restricted) delegation : an experimental comparison
Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph - 2016
mixed strategy equilibrium under communication, which strictly outperforms optimal restricted delegation and is relatively … find that, in case of delegation, managers (as predicted) put tighter restrictions when interests are less aligned. Workers … send more informative messages under communication than predicted by the pure strategy equilibria. This finding neither …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520494
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Entrepreneurial moral hazard in income insurance
Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochgürtel, Stefan - 2011
We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618
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On committees of experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - 2005
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343285
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Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
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Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games : ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383193
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Power and the privilege of clarity : an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012
We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how … and under which conditions a delegation mechanism can solve this problem. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386160