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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
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Gift exchange in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377053
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Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Dur, Robert A. J.; Sol, Joeri - 2009
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377106
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Auctioning incentive contracts : an experimental study
Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur van de - 2009
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379431
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Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
Non, Jan Adrianus - 2011
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379625
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Peer evaluation : incentives and co-worker relations
Sol, Joeri - 2010
truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team … bonus. Co-worker relations have non-monotic effects on profits in the optimal contract. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380732
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Decision initiation, decision implementation, and the allocation of decision rights
Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2015
Organizations must not only take the right decisions, they must also ensure that these decisions are effectively implemented. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the same members of many organization are often responsible for both decision initiation and implementation. If these have social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333082
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Leniency bias in long-term workplace relationships
Tichem, Jan - 2013
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
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Inverse adverse selection : the market for gems
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2010
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
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On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses
Denderski, Piotr; Stoltenberg, Christian - 2021
We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545133