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Control without deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - 2000
experimentprompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from adeceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to free-ridingthan cooperation on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304381
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Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods
Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2000
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303327
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The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment
Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - 2006
This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346451
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The breakdown of morale
Vikander, Nick - 2009
encourage cooperation may actually hurt morale, by convincing opportunistic team members to imitate and later take advantage of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377833
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The evolution of morality
Veelen, Matthijs van - 2020
equilibrium in prisoners' dilemmas or public goods games. We suggest that in order to understand human morality, and human … a better match with actual human behaviour, including ingredients of morality such as honesty, responsibility, and … similar rates of repetition, have not evolved the morality that humans have. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427580
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Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - 2006 - This version: 2006-11-20
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that … an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350382
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Group formation in a public good experiment : on the dynamics of social ties structures
Sonnemans, Joep; Dijk, Frans van; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999
Economic behavior often takes place in groups of small numbers of peopleinteracting with each other (like work teams, neighborhoods, socialnetworks, etc.). Characteristic of such interaction is the development of(affective) interpersonal relationships, or social ties. According tosociologists,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302615
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The economics of altruistic punishment and the demise of cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343948
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The costs and benefits of providing open space in cities
Rouwendal, Jan; Straaten, J. Willemijn van der - 2008
Although many researchers have investigated the value of open space in cities, few of them have compared them to the costs of providing this amenity. In this paper, we use the monocentric model of a city to derive a simple cost-benefit rule for the optimal provision of open space. The rule is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373817
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Compensatory public good provision by a private cartel
Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter; Toth, Lukas - 2019 - Revision: March 2020
To stimulate companies to take corporate social responsibility collectively, for example for fair trade or the environment, their agreements may be exempted from cartel law. To qualify, the public benefits must compensate consumers for higher prices of the private good. We study the balancing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149732