Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using … exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more … not apply under the old system of more lax screening, those who are discouraged from applying are in worse health, have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026029
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303310
The paper studies information processing imperfections in a fully rational decision-making network. It is shown that imperfect information transmission and imperfect information acquisition in a multi-stage selection game yield information overload. The paper analyses the mechanisms responsible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335195
Under-representation of women in high level positions is widespread and persistent. We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high level positions. The key point of our paper is that quotas cause asymmetric information about why women work in high level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011818273
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318577
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379625
risk by overrating the agent's performance. Second, I show that by screening for one supervisor type, firms can incentivize … the supervisor to truthfully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason, screening may be optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
fail to repay. In this paper we asked whether, and to what extent, it may be beneficial to apply a screening mechanism to … purpose, we develop a two-sector infinite horizon model featuring oligopolistic small businesses and a screening contract in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012251378