This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank’s monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks’ ex ante...

We empirically investigate why wholesale funding is fragile by providing the first study of how individual banks borrow and lend in the euro unsecured and secured interbank market. Consistent with theories in which lenders enforce market discipline by monitoring counterparty credit risk and...

We analyse the poisonous interaction between bank rescues, financial fragility and sovereign debt discounts. In our model balance sheet constrained financial intermediaries finance both capital expenditure of intermediate goods producers and government deficits. The financial intermediaries face...

Does demand for safety create instability ? Secured (repo) funding can be made so safe that it never runs, but shifts risk to unsecured creditors. We show that this triggers more frequent runs by unsecured creditors, even in the absence of fundamental risk. This effect is separate from the...

We develop Hawkes models in which events are triggered through self as well as cross-excitation. We examine whether incorporating cross-excitation improves the forecasts of extremes in asset returns compared to only self-excitation. The models are applied to US stocks, bonds and dollar exchange...

We introduce a new model for time-varying spatial dependence. The model extends the well-known static spatial lag model. All parameters can be estimated conveniently by maximum likelihood. We establish the theoretical properties of the model and show that the maximum likelihood estimator for the...

Longitudinal network data are increasingly available, allowing researchers to model how networks evolve over time and to make inference on their dependence structure. In this paper, a dynamic latent space approach is used to model directed networks of monthly interbank exposures. In this model,...

CoCo's (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a Diamond-Dybvig model cast in a global games framework, we show that while the CoCo conversion of the issuing bank may bring the bank back into compliance with capital...

When designing schemes to help SMEs survive crises, the government typically faces asymmetric information, so that it cannot target the SMEs most worth saving. We show that the government can exploit the information in the borrower loan demand to improve policy targets compared with existing...