We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest … in process R&D. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More … importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when …

in separate stages, as then firms want to limit the toll competition by setting lower capacities; or when firms set … higher capacities. In our Stackelberg competition, the firms that act last have few if any capacity decisions to influence …. Hence, they are more concerned with the toll-competition substage, and set a higher volume/capacity ratio than sociall y …

defined insurance and non-insurance markets based on the initial loss size, we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer … power have incentives to create insurance markets. Insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not … our theory and find support. Monopolistic insurer-subjects in non-insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish …

-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids … two firms reduces the probability of having a duopoly but increases the probability that some firm will serve the industry …

competition, akin to the competition in wholesale electricity markets. An acute form of market power may arise if a supplier is …