Showing 1 - 10 of 2,446
justice and a loss of control over the size of the sanction. We use the signaling model of social behavior by Bénabou and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844573
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334832
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720732
This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a "market for lemons" with competitive search...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053938
Speeding up the exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. The price quotes of high-frequency market makers are more likely to meet speculative high-frequency "bandits", thus less likely to meet liquidity traders. The bid-ask spread is raised in response. The recursive dynamic model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384388
game theory of the firm. A theoretical case for picking winners through a preferential innovative policy is discussed in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377579
This paper examines international trade in tainted food and other low-quality products. Wefirst find that for a large class of environments, free trade is the trading system that conveysthe highest incentives to produce non-tainted high-quality goods by foreign exporters.However, free trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379610
We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304379
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348717
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011318577