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Penalising on the basis of the severity of the offence : a sophisticated revenue-based cartel penalty
Katsulakos, Giannēs S.; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - 2017
cartels, including revenue-based penalties, the most widely used regime. We showed that for a typical industry overcharge …-based penalties welfare-dominate the others. However these penalties are subject to criticisms on the grounds of high implementation … the offence. We show that this hybrid regime can replicate the desirable welfare properties of overcharge-based penalties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772887
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Measuring the effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions : a conceptual framework
Katsulakos, Giannēs S.; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - 2016
analyzed in the existing literature. In addition we take account of the structure and toughness of penalties. In this framework …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431514
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Legal principles in antitrust enforcement
Houba, Harold - 2013 - Revised version: August 2013
We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224778
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Penalizing cartels : the case for basing penalties on price overcharge
Katsulakos, Giannēs S.; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Ulph, David - 2014
In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather … of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue …, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408455
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Competitive prices as profit-maximizing cartel prices
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2010
Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380471
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Antitrust enforcement and marginal deterrence
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720709
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Tracing the base : a topographic test for collusive basing-point pricing
Bos, Iwan; Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter - 2009
Basing-point pricing is known to have been abused by geographically dispersed firms in order to eliminate competition on transportation costs. This paper develops a topographic test for collusive basing-point pricing. The method uses transaction data (prices, quantities) and customer project...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377553
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Status-seeking in violent subcultures and the double dividend of zero-tolerance
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2006
This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348346
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Maximal cartel pricing and leniency programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2008
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377398
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The effects of leniency on maximal cartel pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - 2009
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378956