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Party governance and the selection of parliamentarians

Beniers, Klaas J. - 2005

This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parliament who votes against the leader's policy. A competent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346481

Election systems, the "beauty premium" in politics, and the beauty of dissent

Potrafke, Niklas; Rösch, Marcus; Ursprung, Heinrich W. - 2020

We ask three questions. First, do election systems differ in how they translate physical attractiveness of candidates into electoral success? Second, do political parties strategically exploit the "beauty premium" when deciding on which candidates to nominate, and, third, do elected MPs use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220044

Political regimes, party ideological homogeneity and polarization

Castanheira, Micael; Crutzen, Benoît - 2022

We develop a model of elections in which parties choose their ideological position and the ideology of their candidates. Tighter candidate selection reduces policy uncertainty for voters. We show that weak institutional con- straints, as in a Presidential regime, induce parties to allow their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013413504

Reputation shocks and strategic responses in electoral campaigns

Poblete Cazenave, Rubén - 2021

Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both incumbent and challenger increase their campaign...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545128

Does electoral competition create incentives for political parties to collect information about the pros and cons of alternative policies?

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H. - 2004

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342563

Punching above one's weight : the case against election campaigns

Haan, Marco; Los, Bart; Onderstal, Sander; Riyanto, … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985254

Punching above one's weight : the case against election campaigns

Haan, Marco; Los, Bart; Onderstal, Sander; Riyanto, … - 2010

Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380750

Why do policy makers stick to inefficient decisions?

Dur, Robert A. J. - 1999 - This draft: June 1999

This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301144

Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition

Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2005

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335188

Politicians' motivation, role of elections, and policy choices

Wrasai, Phongthorn - 2005

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in … describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running … public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters want to control …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343267