In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be...

Since the 1950's economists applied game theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980's economists also show a growing interest in the...

The likelihood of cancer emergence is highly dependent on the underlying tissue structure. This article gives evolutionary explanations for why natural selection fails to select for tissue structures that would minimize the likelihood of cancer. In a second step, a mathematical framework is...

In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform)...