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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049

Killing the bearer of ill tidings : a theory of consensus-provision moral hazard

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Milbourn, Todd; Thakor, Anjan V. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000986122

Voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system

Beetsma, Roel; Romp, Ward E.; Vos, Siert J. - 2011 - This version: March 16, 2011

We explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the … increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty. We find that it is likely that mandatory participation is … necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386164

Poverty and uncertainty attitudes

Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H. - 2024

This paper demonstrates that well-established biases in decision making under uncertainty can generate poverty traps. A theoretical framework is developed to demonstrate that: i) probability weighting and ambiguity attitude can lead individuals to erroneously undervalue profitable investments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015062969

Disciplining and screening top executives

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - 2006

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349199

Insurance and information : firms as a commitment device

Bovenberg, Ary Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2001

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316894

A theory of risk pooling and voluntary liquidation of firms : with an application to township-village enterprises in China

Zou, Liang; Sun, Laixiang - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000997543

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2006

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335185

Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002048152

Entrepreneurial moral hazard in income insurance

Ejrnæs, Mette; Hochgürtel, Stefan - 2011

We study entrepreneurs’ behavioral responses of effort (moral hazard) to avoid business failure.This is done in the context of an unemployment insurance scheme for self-employed, wherewe estimate how much of the transition probability to unemployment can be causally attributedto being insured....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376618

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